This week the stock market reached a 15-month high with the FTSE 100 rising above 5,441 points – the last time it scaled such heights was the last trading day before Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008.
The rally, which has seen the FTSE rise almost 22% this year, has prompted some fears of a stock market bubble. Guardian.co.uk/money asked six investment fund managers and advisers if investors should feel confident about their equity holdings or should be shifting their investments.
Aruna Karunathilake, manager of UK aggressive fund, Fidelity International
“I think we are far away from being in a bubble with the UK stock market reasonably priced. It is slap bang in the middle of its historic price-to-earnings range so looks pretty good value to me. When I look at the stock market and compare it to the rates on bank deposit accounts, the alternatives do not look very attractive. The biggest risk is a double dip in the economy, but my view is that it is stabilising. With my personal investments I am happy with equities and if anything am looking to add to them.”
Mark Dampier, head of research, Hargreaves Lansdown
“You have to be a bit careful in late December and the new year because you tend to get a false market. We have seen the Christmas rally that you often get, so will not get a true idea of the market until the second week of January.
“Most of the markets have had a strong run in 2009. A lot of that has been from the government stimulus that is being slowly withdrawn. So I would not jump on board anything, but if you look at pharmaceuticals, telecoms and defence they are undervalued and look quite good.
“They have not bounced back nearly as much as other stocks and have really good yields that look safe. Next year could be hard and the stocks that perform well could be different from this year. You want stocks that are visibly earning and not economically sensitive, companies with organic growth and some kind of niche that will trade through difficult conditions.”
Jeremy Smith, manager of UK equity fund, Neptune Investment Management
“If you read stockbroker reports many people are worried that 2010 will be a harder year to generate consistent returns… A lot of people have written off the UK market as it is not China or Brazil, but it is international in composition. The recovery in the global economy is going to throw up some pockets of growth. It is important to take a long-term view and we are focusing on those with quality growth rather than the cheapest stocks in the market. Those in more cyclical areas, that have been the driving force of the rally, will find 2010 a more difficult year.”
David Cumming, head of UK equities, Standard Life Investments
“Looking at the ratings in terms of equity yields they are low when compared to the yields from regular interest rates. If you had £1m in the bank it would be doing nothing. There is no reason why we will not see a rise in the FTSE to 6000 at some point next year. If you look at the figures from December 1997 then you see we are at roughly the same point as 12 years ago. People forget how little it has moved in the last 12 years.
“The market sometimes moves upward at the end of the year with people putting cash in, but the economic trends are broadly positive. The economy is entering a recovery phase with house prices up and revised economic growth figures. The rating of the market is roughly in line with long-term averages. If you look at the hard data, things are clearly looking upwards.”
Deryck Noble-Nesbitt, director of research and UK smaller companies, Close Asset Management
“We are still well below where we were 10 years ago in the stock market. You really know when you are in a bubble when people are sitting around coffee talking about equities and how good they are, just like people were with property two or three years ago. It is not like that at the moment so that is a good indicator that we are not in a bubble. Equities are never safe in the short term because sentiment can drive the economy down, but in the long term equities offer relative value.”
Luke Newman, head of UK absolute return fund, Gartmore
“There has been a similar equity market in 2009 to that of 2003 and 2004, but we are now at an inflection point and we are likely to see the market act differently. It is important to look differently at the prospects of the UK economy and the UK stock market. The prospects for the economy remain difficult, but that does not necessarily mean that all UK listed companies will be affected.”So far there has been little differentiation as stocks have risen on the tide up from the lows in the market, but now really consistent higher quality companies are beginning to outperform. These are companies with strong market positions and an ability to fund growth here and abroad moving forward.
“Pharmaceuticals such as Glaxo and Astra Zeneca, oil companies such as BP and Shell, as well as Imperial Tobacco, Prudential and Diageo are all large UK-listed companies with earnings from overseas that we will see outperforming heavily indebted housebuilders and engineering companies. They will benefit from the strength of the dollar and starting from strong positions with their balance sheets.”
Obama’s First Year: ‘Great Expectations,’ ‘Daunting Realities’
Tags: commentary, obama, politics, war
December 30, 2009
President Obama is nearing completion of his first year in office. How would you summarize his accomplishments in the foreign policy field?
I would summarize President Obama’s first year in office as follows: Great expectations running smack into daunting realities; realities are winning.
Were the expectations caused by the public’s disillusion with President George W. Bush and the feeling that Obama would accomplish more?
The great expectations are really a testament to President Obama’s skills as a politician and to his own biography and to the failures of the Bush administration. Those three things came together and led many Americans and many people outside of the United States to hope that Barack Obama would have the key to solving what, in reality, is a long list of very difficult, perhaps intractable problems.
And do you think that’s what led the Nobel Committee to award him a prize when even he had to admit he had not achieved any significant results in foreign affairs?
[W]hat we’ve seen over the second half of 2009 is the president scaling back the nature of [U.S.] goals in Afghanistan to something more achievable. [The United States has] gone from defeating the Taliban to degrading their capabilities.
Certainly the decision by the Nobel Peace Prize Committee was an award based on potential and in some ways a backhanded slap at President George W. Bush, whose policies the members of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee really disliked. The sad thing for President Obama is that winning the award actually made his job of accomplishing his goals in foreign policy harder because it led to the inevitable questions, not just by Americans but by people outside the United States, as to what he has actually done to deserve the award. The president, to his credit, did not dodge the issue in his Nobel speech. He confronted it head on and talked about the award as recognition of what people hope that he can accomplish and his commitment to living up to the goals of the Nobel Peace Prize.
I was struck by how, in his first weeks in office, President Obama was appointing special envoys to many of the tough areas. He picked former Senator George J. Mitchell to work on Israeli-Palestinian issues. After a year of shuttling back and forth to the Middle East, Mitchell must feel enormously frustrated.
That decision to appoint envoys and to tackle some of the toughest issues in American foreign policy early on stemmed directly from how the president campaigned during the election. What candidate Obama argued was that [the United States] had to put diplomacy at the forefront of American foreign policy, and so when he became president, one of the first things he did was to take some tangible steps to show that he intended to use diplomacy to advance American foreign policy interests. It was never lost on the president, however, that diplomacy never was, and never will be, a magic solution for the troubles [the United States] faces. What many people missed in many of Barack Obama’s campaign speeches is that when he talked about diplomacy, he did not offer it up as a magic bullet, and he often acknowledged how difficult the challenges are facing the United States. And what Senator Mitchell has discovered first hand is, in fact, the difficulty of moving forward.
In his campaign speeches, Obama always said that Afghanistan was more important than Iraq. As president, he called it in August a “war of necessity,” and then after a long period of study, he decided to increase the troop level there by thirty thousand. At the same time, he announced July 2011 as the date for beginning the withdrawal. How important is Afghanistan to his administration?
Let me just make a brief remark about Iraq first then talk about Afghanistan. The fact that Iraq is not on the front page of the newspapers is actually good news. There are a lot of problems in Iraq. Iraq is still not out of the woods, but the news coming out of Iraq is reasonably good and provides some reason for optimism that [the United States] will, in fact, be able to withdraw U.S. combat troops over the president’s proposed nineteen-month time horizon. On Afghanistan, you are right. Candidate Obama often pointed toward Afghanistan as the war [the United States] should have been fighting, rather than fighting the war in Iraq. He made producing forward momentum in Afghanistan a priority early on.
[S]o far the United States has not found that talking tough or talking sweetly moves the government of Iran, which is why over the next twelve months Iran is likely to be a major headache for President Obama.
He announced early this year he was sending twenty-one thousand more U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Having done that, the president’s expectation in the spring of 2009 was that he had turned the corner in Afghanistan, which is why when General [Stanley] McChrystal [commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan] did his review in the summer of 2009 and came back and said, “We’re in deep trouble in Afghanistan,” the president and much of the White House staff were caught by surprise. And what we’ve seen over the second half of 2009 is the president scaling back the nature of [U.S.] goals in Afghanistan to something more achievable. [The United States has] gone from defeating the Taliban to degrading their capabilities. And the result of the very deliberate decision-making process in the fall of 2009 was to come up with a series of achievable goals and a workable strategy for reaching them.
And the United States is kind of stuck with the fact that there is a president in Afghanistan who most officials in this country think isn’t very capable and is open to corruption. This of course diminishes the support for Afghanistan in Washington, I suppose.
That’s the dilemma that you face in every kind of insurgency situation. If the government were popular, effective, and efficient, you, in all likelihood, wouldn’t have an insurgency. So the challenge for the United States is not simply a military challenge of degrading Taliban capabilities, but of working to improve the ability and efficiency of Afghanistan’s political institutions, and that is an extraordinarily tall order. That’s why I wouldn’t be surprised if over the next eighteen months, the military is able to turn the tide in the battle against the Taliban, but unless there is some dramatic improvement in Kabul, [the United States] will be in a position in which it’s not clear that the Afghan government can survive on its own.
Obama came into the office on a pledge of trying to seek a dialogue with the Iranians. He went to extraordinary lengths, sending private messages to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and speaking publicly to the Iranian people on their new year. But so far, he doesn’t seem to have to gotten much in return. The United States is routinely scorned by the Iranian leadership.
President Obama sought to engage Iran’s government, as you suggest. The answer hasn’t been the one he’d hoped for. This has created a problem for Barack Obama back in the United States. It raises serious questions about his entire strategy of engagement, and certainly his domestic political opponents have seized on it to argue that he hasn’t been tough enough in dealing with the Iranians. But the broader issue here is that, so far, the United States has not found that talking tough or talking sweetly moves the government of Iran, which is why over the next twelve months Iran is likely to be a major headache for President Obama.
With each passing month, Iran gets closer to a potential nuclear capability. No one regards that as a good thing for the Middle East, and the question that is going to face the president and his advisers is what you do about it. Do you launch a military strike with all of the attendant risks and dangers to American forces in the region? Do you give a green light to the Israelis to make an attack with all of the risks in that strategy? Do you step back from your rhetoric and say, “OK, now we’re going to try and contain Iran,” with all the risk attendant to allowing Iran to go nuclear when you said you would not let that happen? It’s going to be a very difficult series of policy choices for President Obama to work through.
Do you think it is still possible the Iranians might try to strike a deal before Obama’s year-end deadline hits?
The reality is that the government in Tehran had been willing to make concessions, and then it yanked those concessions back. I would expect that if the Obama administration is successful in getting the Russians and Chinese to impose more significant sanctions on Tehran–that’s a big “if”–we will see Tehran at least make some gestures to indicate a willingness to work out a deal. That’s not the same thing as striking a deal. What complicates all of this is that from the best we can tell, there is significant jockeying for power within Iran. Different factions are trying to establish their control, and all of the members of the ruling coalition feel greatly threatened by the rise of the opposition in the wake of the disputed June elections. That mix makes it very difficult for engagement strategy to work, in part because back in Tehran, people you’re hoping might be willing to stick their necks out to do a deal are worried about what’s going to happen if they do. And so the political dynamics in Tehran right now don’t seem to favor major diplomatic breakthroughs.
I was looking at an essay by Aaron David Miller, who said that Obama’s kind of like a Gulliver who’s pinned down by all these little countries that make it almost impossible to achieve anything. Do you like that analogy?
[The United States] wants China to change its behavior on currency; we also want China to do a bunch of other things for us, and we’re going to be sending mixed messages.
It’s not an analogy I would use. It’s not the president who’s tied down. It’s the reality of the situation that the United States faces. The United States has tremendous unrivaled military power, but as we saw in Iraq, having unrivaled military power doesn’t solve all of your problems. And again, if you look at the Bush administration, which no one doubted was willing to exercise America’s military might, it was not able to solve these problems. In part, this is because in dealing with regimes like North Korea or Iran you have to have, or be able to create, a set of pressures–either externally or internally–that leads them to want to compromise. So far, in Tehran, they don’t see it in their interest to compromise or strike a deal, and successive American presidents, Democratic and Republican, have been seeking to pull the levers of power to make that happen. The problem doesn’t adhere to a particular president, it’s in the nature of the situation.
We haven’t talked about Obama’s relations with China. When he was in China in November, the Chinese in effect “muzzled” him by not allowing him to speak to the Chinese people, and by not allowing questions at his brief news conference at the end of the trip. And even though China and United States are major trade partners, there were considerable disagreements in Copenhagen at the recent climate control conference.
Getting U.S.-Chinese relations right is going to be one of the biggest challenges President Obama faces. The president and his advisers clearly understand that on most of the issues the United States cares about–Iran, climate change, trade, international finance–China is going to be a major player. The question is, “How do you get the Chinese to cooperate?” Obviously, on the economic front, there are a number of very troubling signs of the Chinese playing the role of the spoiler, of free riding on the system to extract benefits for themselves. As long as the U.S. economy has a high unemployment rate, there is going to be growing pressure on the Obama White House to do something about China’s trade policies and, even more importantly, China’s currency policies. China currently fixes its currency to the dollar, rather than letting it float. This has had the effect of making Chinese goods cheaper than they should be, which helps Chinese exports, but is doing great damage to many of the economies in Southeast Asia.
The real pressure, going forward in the Obama administration, is to push the Chinese to change their policies. That’s going to be difficult to do because there’s actually a battle within Beijing about what China’s economic policy should be, how much it should rely on export-led growth versus domestic demand. [The United States] wants China to change its behavior on currency; we also want China to do a bunch of other things for us, and we’re going to be sending mixed messages.
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