economics

March 15, 2010

Thai Central Bank Eases Forex Rules

Filed under: Uncategorized — ktetaichinh @ 8:49 pm
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BANGKOK—The Bank of Thailand took steps to ease foreign-exchange rules in an effort to boost capital outflows, which included proposing the removal of the $200 million annual limit on investment and lending to affiliated companies offshore.

The effect of the amended outflows regulations on the foreign-exchange market isn’t expected to be substantial. But analysts warned that corporations could use the more convenient hedging tools as speculative channels, increasing baht volatility.

Starting Tuesday, importers and exporters will no longer have to provide an explanation and seek approval from the central bank when unwinding positions larger than $20,000. That will allow them to freely unwind foreign-exchange hedging transactions, helping them better manage their exchange-rate risks.

“Such relaxation aims at providing more flexibility for importers and exporters in managing their exchange-rate risk, as well as enhancing their ability to manage the risk,” the central bank said in a statement. “Another objective is to promote the development of the foreign-exchange market to better reflect demand and supply of foreign exchange in the market.”

But the new rules may have some unintended consequences.

“If there’s no restriction whatsoever for corporates to unwind their positions, we’re probably going to see more speculation activities from these corporates, and volatility will inevitably increase,” a senior currency dealer at a local bank said.

In addition, a dealer at another bank said, “With the restriction removed, we’ll probably see more single-direction orders from every party in the market—not two-way movement as intended by the central bank.”

If the baht strengthens, importers could join the buying spree by unwinding their long-dollar positions and seeking to build them back up later, at a more favorable rate.

Another change the central bank made was to raise the limit on total overseas portfolio investment to $50 billion from $30 billion, also effective Tuesday.

The Bank of Thailand also plans to scrap the $200 million annual limit on investment and lending to affiliated companies abroad.

Thai-listed companies were already allowed to make unlimited direct investments abroad, but the changes extend the rule to unlisted companies as well, which have faced the $200 million limit.

The Finance Ministry must approve the change, but Minister Korn Chatikavanij last week indicated his support for the central bank’s proposals.

Bank of Thailand Deputy Governor Bandid Nijathaworn said the investment limit in offshore property would be raised to $10 million a year from $5 million. Thai companies also would be allowed to lend as much as $50 million a year to non-affiliated firms abroad. These changes are expected to take effect before the end of February.

“These relaxations are expected to add more balance to the country’s capital flows, provide more investment alternatives to Thai companies and individuals, as well as enhance competitiveness of Thai companies,” Mr. Bandid said.

The Bank of Thailand expects the baht to be more volatile this year, and the new rules come at a time when the local unit is under appreciation pressure, in tandem with other regional currencies, which could lessen the need for the central bank’s regular interventions.

The release of details of the new rules—which were flagged by Bank of Thailand Governor Tarisa Watanagase last week—had little impact on the baht. In New York trade early Monday, the dollar was at 33.16 baht, down from 33.179 baht late Friday.

Write to Phisanu Phromchanya at phisanu.phromchanya@dowjones.com

March 14, 2010

Yen Lending Rate Indicates Stronger Dollar

Filed under: Uncategorized — ktetaichinh @ 4:02 pm
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A closely watched rate for borrowing Japanese yen—the yen’s three-month benchmark London interbank offered rate, or Libor—fell below its U.S. dollar counterpart Thursday for the first time in six months. Libor is a key gauge of liquidity in short-term funding markets and a benchmark rate for short-term borrowing by companies and consumers.

..

That bout of dollar weakness ended in December as market players began betting that the U.S. Federal Reserve Board will raise interest rates later this year or in early 2011 as the U.S. economy recovers and fears rise that easy credit could lead to bubbles down the road. That contrasts with expectations that the Bank of Japan will keep its policy rate at ultra-low levels as it fights deflation in the world’s second-largest economy.

Prices of Fed-funds futures also fell Thursday, indicating rising expectations among market participants that the U.S. central bank will hike its benchmark rate late in the year. The November fed-funds contract priced in a 70% chance that the Fed will lift the fed-funds rate to 0.5% from the current range of 0.0%-0.25% at its early November policy meeting.

March 13, 2010

North Korea draws on tobacco for cash

Filed under: Uncategorized — ktetaichinh @ 4:15 am
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A North Korea desperate for foreign exchange has been generating hard currency by re-exporting British cigarettes, despite renewed efforts by the international community to apply tougher sanctions on the impoverished state.

North Korean and other Asian trading entities started re-exporting State Express 555 cigarettes, manufactured by British American Tobacco, in February last year, just months before North Korea’s second nuclear test in four years prompted the United Nations to impose tougher sanctions on Pyongyang.

BAT sold the so-called “NK 555s”, made and packaged in Singapore for the North Korean market, to a Singaporean distributor for shipment to Nampo, a port near Pyongyang.

North Korea ThumbnailHowever, at least 15,000 cases worth $6.3m (€4.6m, £4.2m) rebounded out of Nampo to ports in Vietnam and the Philippines, according to documents seen by the Financial Times, to go to other markets where they commanded a higher price.

While the UN banned luxury goods exports to North Korea, member nations have been allowed to compile their own sanctions lists, which critics say created loopholes.

The US, Japan, Australia and Canada banned a broad range of tobacco products. Meanwhile, the European Union and Singapore sanctioned only cigars, which allowed BAT to continue exporting NK 555 cigarettes to North Korea. BAT said it halted exports of the cigarettes from Singapore to North Korea after discovering a diverted cargo of NK 555s in August.

International tobacco companies frown on “grey market” or “parallel” exports of their products to markets for which they were not intended. But national customs authorities target counterfeits rather than so-called “diverted real product”.

The diversions offer a rare glimpse into how the impoverished country can secure foreign exchange – especially as the noose tightens on arms exports.

International security agencies have also cracked down on suspected North Korean smuggling of narcotics and counterfeit $100 bills in recent years, forcing the regime to find other sources of hard currency.

The NK 555 diversions may be part of a much larger flow of dollar-earning re-exports. Their interruption comes at an awkward time for a regime that has tested the patience of the international community.

Closer to home, a populace with memories of severe 1990s-era famines is infuriated by Pyongyang’s recently botched currency reform programme.

“The turmoil in North Korea is self-inflicted and far more damaging than the [UN] sanctions,” said Marcus Noland, a North Korea expert with the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington.

BAT has maintained some business ties to the country. It still supplies its former Pyongyang joint venture, from which it divested in 2007, with materials to make and sell cheaper Craven A cigarettes on the domestic market.

BAT says 175m NK 555s were exported to North Korea in 2008. They were made and packaged in Singapore which, like the EU, banned exports of cigars but not cigarettes.

The London-based company sold the NK 555s to SUTL Group, a family-controlled distributor in Singapore, for onward shipment to the North Korean port of Nampo.

“When we became aware of the diversion, we immediately launched an investigation,” Pat Heneghan, global head of BAT’s anti-illicit trade division, told the FT. “We certainly didn’t like what we found.”

While there was no evidence of any involvement by SUTL in the diversion, Mr Heneghan said BAT still had “a very hard discussion with the distributor”. SUTL declined to comment.

There is no evidence that the re-export of NK 555s by a number of unidentifiable North Korean entities and other small trading companies across Asia was illegal.

While tobacco companies consider the re-routing of legitimate cigarettes from their intended market as “illicit”, they are not necessarily “illegal” in the eyes of customs authorities focused on counterfeits and smuggling.

“In August last year, BAT discovered a diverted NK 555 shipment in Singapore, which we assumed could be for transhipment to other markets in Asia,” said a BAT spokeswoman. “But we were unable to inspect the shipment as we could not demonstrate any breach of Singapore law to the authorities.”

On April 10 2009, the NK 555 re-exports were discussed in an e-mail sent by a Singapore-based cigarette trader to a potential buyer in Manila.

“We have to confirm by next week,” wrote Bert Lee of Compass Inc. “Empty containers will have to start moving into Nampo . . . So kindly speak and plan with your buyer and let me know if you want to take up this new NK 555 Blue.”

Compass began to sell cases of NK 555 to a Hong Kong-based trading company in early 2009. E-mails and shipping documents show the cigarettes were first diverted to Dalian, a Chinese port, and then shipped on to Singapore before finally landing in Haiphong in Vietnam.

While the trail ran cold in Haiphong, people tracking the shipment suspected its ultimate destination was China.

“They sell it to someone who can handle it for the China market,” said one person involved in the trade, who asked not to be identified.

Invoices sent from Compass to its Hong Kong buyer in February 2009 do not reveal the North Korean source of the NK 555s. But Mr Lee left no doubt about the cigarettes’ provenance.

“Stocks are now in NK and sample already send [sic] out to us,” he wrote to his potential buyer in Manila. “I hope we can work on this New Blue [555] and controlling the market and stocks as soon as possible.” Mr Lee did not reply to phone calls, e-mails and faxes from the FT.

“As a trader, we just get the product and buy and sell,” said one Compass executive who declined to identify himself or comment on the NK 555 shipments when contacted by telephone. “Where it goes, who knows?”

Additional reporting by Christian Oliver in Seoul

March 7, 2010

Consumer reactions to exchange rate and trade price shifts: New evidence from online book retailing

Filed under: Uncategorized — ktetaichinh @ 8:50 pm
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How much of a change in exchange rates is required to redress global imbalances? This column presents new evidence from online bookstores suggesting that neither shoppers nor retailers react to price differences across borders. This implies that realignment of cross-country consumption levels may require large and persistent exchange rate changes.

Over the last few years, the potential consequences of “global imbalances” and their role in the build-up to the current crisis has been the topic of fervent discussion (see for example Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009).

Eliminating such imbalances could be done through exchange rate movements and indeed, in the case of the US-China imbalance, a revaluation of the renembi has come to be the dominant policy recommendation in the US (see for example Reisen 2009). A weaker dollar, the theory goes, would make US exports cheaper and Chinese exports more expensive and these relative price changes would help balance trade. Yet, for this to happen, markets need to be integrated in the sense that price changes lead to expenditure shifting. If markets are strongly segmented – in the sense that firms and consumers treat the markets as quite distinct with little cross-market interaction – then movements in relative prices will only cause a limited shift in expenditures.

One line of research into the ability of exchange rate changes to shift expenditure patterns looks at the link between exchange rates and local prices. Numerous studies have looked at this response. The vast majority of them find very little “pass-through” of exchange rates to local prices (see for example Campa and Goldberg 2005 and Gopinath et al. 2009).

In particular, large and widespread deviations from the law of one price have been documented. Comparable products, in particular consumer goods, are found to sell for widely divergent prices across countries. In many cases, however, small transaction costs can probably explain a large part of these deviations. For example, while grocery prices may differ significantly across the border, trade barriers, costs of transportation, as well as opportunity cost of time are likely to seriously hamper the role of arbitrage. The lack of information on what those costs may be, as well as their size, makes it difficult to infer to which degree international markets are indeed segmented. In addition, products are often tailored to local markets, and may therefore not be perfect substitutes.

New evidence on the expenditure shifting

In a recent study (Boivin et al. 2010), we purposely focus on a market where such frictions are arguably minimal – online bookselling in the US and Canada. We collected high-frequency data, between March 2008 and June 2009, from the websites of the main players in this market (Amazon.com and BN.com in the US and Amazon.ca and Chapters.ca in Canada).

What are the features that make the online book market and our data set appropriate for this type of study?

  • First, each product is identical across retailers, which makes our analysis immune to issues of quality, packaging, and size differences which are present in the data used in earlier studies.
  • Second, price comparisons can be readily done online and so shopping or search costs should be orders of magnitude lower than for non-online items.
  • Third, according to the NAFTA agreement, books are not subject to trade restrictions or tariffs and there are no constraints on buying books from foreign websites between these two countries.
  • Fourth, the nature of the industry is such that the physical concept of distance is irrelevant; the consumer does not have to travel to purchase the good and rather must incur shipping costs, which we observe.
  • Fifth, Canada and the US are among the most economically integrated countries in the world, with similar tastes and economic environments.
  • Finally, for some websites, we have proxies for (relative) sales, which make it possible to study the reaction of quantities to movements in international relative prices.

Sticky prices

One may expect that internet prices should be particularly flexible as frictions such as menu costs are minimal. Yet, our data show that price stickiness is pervasive (there is also tremendous heterogeneity in price setting practices across retailers). Combined with an appreciation of more than 20% of the US dollar versus its Canadian counterpart, the result is significant fluctuations in relative international prices.

Figure 1 shows the fraction of items that an American consumer could find for cheaper at Amazon.ca than Amazon.com, taking into account shipping costs. Based on the shipping costs for a four-book bundle, up to 40% of the 213 best-seller books in our sample are cheaper in Canada from a US perspective. The size of the deviations from the law of one price can also be significant, reaching up to 60% in some cases.

Figure 1. Percenatge of books which are cheaper in Canada, for a US resident, by pairs of retailers (including shipping costs).

Note: Various bundle sizes: 1 book (solid line), 4 books (dashed) and 8 books (dotted).

This evidence does not imply necessarily that the Canadian and US markets are segmented. After all, price differences for online books exist even at the national level. Yet, if retailers were wary of international competition, one would expect that variations in international relative prices through exchange rate movements would lead firms to re-price items. But this is not what we observe, even for a market where frictions are arguably minimal:

  • Retailers are not more likely to re-price books which are in deviation of the law of one price
  • The timing of price changes is not a function of the size of the deviation from the law of one price or exchange rate movements
  • When retailers change prices, there is no conclusive evidence that they move in a direction consistent with the presence of integrated markets

One possibility is that even under the hypothesis of integrated markets, international competition is not a significant concern relative to other forces, and therefore is not reflected in pricing decisions. Yet, even if local prices were to be kept constant, wouldn’t we still find evidence that quantities sold react to exchange rate fluctuations?
If markets are not fully segmented, then the fact that books in Canada become cheaper following an appreciation of the US dollar should be reflected in higher sales for Canadian retailers. Using sales rankings as proxies for quantities, we find no evidence supporting such behaviour.

Discussion and implications

Our study focuses on an activity where trade barriers are minimal, information is cheaply available and products are homogenous. If pervasive cross-border arbitrage was ever going to arise, it would be in sectors like online book retailing. What we find is that even in this sector, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the international border segments the markets. What, then, should we make of these findings?

  • First, one may argue that the international price differentials we observe are simply not large enough to trigger a reaction from shoppers and retailers. The implication, then, is that rather large exchange rate swings may be necessary to fight current global imbalances.
  • Another possibility is that exchange rate movements need to be highly persistent in order to have a significant impact on prices and quantities. In particular, persistent fluctuations may be more likely to lead to adjustments of imported input costs, which are then passed through to consumers.

Insofar as the re-balancing of global current account positions is concerned, our work suggests that realignment of cross-country consumption levels may require large and persistent exchange rate changes.

References

Bernanke, Ben S (2009), “Asia and the Global Financial Crisis”, Remarks prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Asia Economic Policy Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, 18-20 October.

Boivin, Jean, Robert Clark and Nicolas Vincent (2010), “Virtual Borders: Online Nominal Rigidities and International Market Segmentation”, NBER Working Paper 15642.

Campa, Jose Manuel and Linda S Goldberg (2005), “Exchange Rate Pass-Through into Import Prices”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(4).

Gopinath, Gita, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Chang-Tai Hsieh, and Nicholas Li (2009), “Estimating the Border Effect: Some New Evidence”, Mimeo Harvard University.

Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff (2009), “Global Imbalances and The Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes”, Paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Asia Economic Policy Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, October 18-20.

Reisen, Helmut (2009), “On the renminbi and economic convergence”, VoxEU.org, 17 December.

February 27, 2010

FX swap

Filed under: Uncategorized — ktetaichinh @ 2:51 pm
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FX swap là một loại derivatives trong đó 2 bên tham gia đồng ý hoán đổi 2 loại ngoại tệ cho nhau trong một thời gian rồi sau đó sẽ hoàn trả lại khoản tiền ban đầu. Ví dụ công ty A có thể ký FX swap với bank B để đổi 1 triệu USD lấy 19 tỷ VNĐ ngày hôm nay, 3 tháng sau A sẽ trả lại B 19 tỷ VNĐ và nhận lại 1 triệu USD. Tất nhiên A phải trả phí và lãi suất cho B nếu lãi suất của USD và VNĐ khác nhau. Vì swap là một loại derivatives và qui tắc kế toán của nhiều nước không/chưa buộc phải đưa các loại contingent liability vào balace sheets nên nhiều công ty, ngân hàng dùng derivatives để che dấu các transactions thực. Trong ví dụ trên cả A và B đều có thể không ghi nhận hợp đồng FX swap này trong balance sheets của mình, A vẫn ghi 1 triệu USD còn B vẫn ghi 19 tỷ VNĐ trên mục assets.
Chính đây là một lỗ hổng để A và B có thể để ra ngoài sổ sách một khoản vay/cho vay bí mật. Giả sử thay vì hoán đổi 1 triệu USD lấy 19 tỷ VNĐ (theo tỷ giá hiện tại) sau khi ký hợp đồng swap, B chuyển cho A 20 tỷ VNĐ. Khi hợp đồng swap hết hạn A trả lại B 20 tỷ (+lãi suất, phí) và nhận lại 1 triệu USD. Như vậy trên thực tế B cho A vay 1 tỷ VNĐ không thế chấp và khoản vay này không xuất hiện trên balance sheets của cả A và B như đã nói ở trên. Tất nhiên cả A và B đều có lợi khi đi vay/cho vay chui như vậy vì debt/equity ratio của A không tăng, trong khi B không phải tăng reserve. B phải chấp nhận credit risk của A nhưng có thể mua bảo hiểm cho rủi ro này trên thị trường CDS.
Trên đây là một ví dụ giả tưởng, nhưng nếu bạn thay A bằng Greece, B bằng Goldman Sachs, 1 triệu USD bằng 10 tỷ USD và 19 tỷ VNĐ bằng 11 tỷ Euro thì đó là những gì báo chí đang bàn tán mấy ngày gần đây. Năm 2001 GS đã bí mật cho Greece vay 1 tỷ Euro thông qua FX swap như đã mô tả bên trên để giúp Greece đạt được yêu cầu của EU về tỷ lệ nợ chính phủ. GS sau đó cũng đã mua CDS để bao hiểm cho rủi ro Greece sẽ default. Đến giờ nhiều người cho rằng không chỉ có Greece mà một số nước có tỷ lệ nợ chính phủ cao cũng sử dụng cách này để che giấu bớt nợ. Tuy nhiên nợ nào thì vẫn là nợ, bạn có thể che dấu con số chính xác với người ngoài hay với các regulators (trong trường hợp của Greece là EU), nhưng bạn không thể tránh được gánh nặng trả nợ (và lãi suất), chưa kể rủi ro tiềm ẩn rất cao cho cả chủ nợ lẫn con nợ.
Hi vọng chính phủ VN chưa và sẽ không dùng chiêu này để giấu nợ, nhưng có lẽ giới doanh nghiệp và ngân hàng VN không lạ gì hình thức qua mặt regulator này (để cho vay vượt trần lãi suất hoặc mua bán ngoại tệ ngoài biên độ).

February 19, 2010

FX swap- Giangle

Filed under: Uncategorized — ktetaichinh @ 7:35 am
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FX swap là một loại derivatives trong đó 2 bên tham gia đồng ý hoán đổi 2 loại ngoại tệ cho nhau trong một thời gian rồi sau đó sẽ hoàn trả lại khoản tiền ban đầu. Ví dụ công ty A có thể ký FX swap với bank B để đổi 1 triệu USD lấy 19 tỷ VNĐ ngày hôm nay, 3 tháng sau A sẽ trả lại B 19 tỷ VNĐ và nhận lại 1 triệu USD. Tất nhiên A phải trả phí và lãi suất cho B nếu lãi suất của USD và VNĐ khác nhau. Vì swap là một loại derivatives và qui tắc kế toán của nhiều nước không/chưa buộc phải đưa các loại contingent liability vào balace sheets nên nhiều công ty, ngân hàng dùng derivatives để che dấu các transactions thực. Trong ví dụ trên cả A và B đều có thể không ghi nhận hợp đồng FX swap này trong balance sheets của mình, A vẫn ghi 1 triệu USD còn B vẫn ghi 19 tỷ VNĐ trên mục assets.
Chính đây là một lỗ hổng để A và B có thể để ra ngoài sổ sách một khoản vay/cho vay bí mật. Giả sử thay vì hoán đổi 1 triệu USD lấy 19 tỷ VNĐ (theo tỷ giá hiện tại) sau khi ký hợp đồng swap, B chuyển cho A 20 tỷ VNĐ. Khi hợp đồng swap hết hạn A trả lại B 20 tỷ (+lãi suất, phí) và nhận lại 1 triệu USD. Như vậy trên thực tế B cho A vay 1 tỷ VNĐ không thế chấp và khoản vay này không xuất hiện trên balance sheets của cả A và B như đã nói ở trên. Tất nhiên cả A và B đều có lợi khi đi vay/cho vay chui như vậy vì debt/equity ratio của A không tăng, trong khi B không phải tăng reserve. B phải chấp nhận credit risk của A nhưng có thể mua bảo hiểm cho rủi ro này trên thị trường CDS.
Trên đây là một ví dụ giả tưởng, nhưng nếu bạn thay A bằng Greece, B bằng Goldman Sachs, 1 triệu USD bằng 10 tỷ USD và 19 tỷ VNĐ bằng 11 tỷ Euro thì đó là những gì báo chí đang bàn tán mấy ngày gần đây. Năm 2001 GS đã bí mật cho Greece vay 1 tỷ Euro thông qua FX swap như đã mô tả bên trên để giúp Greece đạt được yêu cầu của EU về tỷ lệ nợ chính phủ. GS sau đó cũng đã mua CDS để bao hiểm cho rủi ro Greece sẽ default. Đến giờ nhiều người cho rằng không chỉ có Greece mà một số nước có tỷ lệ nợ chính phủ cao cũng sử dụng cách này để che giấu bớt nợ. Tuy nhiên nợ nào thì vẫn là nợ, bạn có thể che dấu con số chính xác với người ngoài hay với các regulators (trong trường hợp của Greece là EU), nhưng bạn không thể tránh được gánh nặng trả nợ (và lãi suất), chưa kể rủi ro tiềm ẩn rất cao cho cả chủ nợ lẫn con nợ.
Hi vọng chính phủ VN chưa và sẽ không dùng chiêu này để giấu nợ, nhưng có lẽ giới doanh nghiệp và ngân hàng VN không lạ gì hình thức qua mặt regulator này (để cho vay vượt trần lãi suất hoặc mua bán ngoại tệ ngoài biên độ).

January 16, 2010

A ‘London loophole’ for FX

Filed under: Uncategorized — ktetaichinh @ 5:11 am
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Posted by Izabella Kaminska on Jan 15 11:20.

The CFTC has had a busy week. On Thursday the regulator unveiled details of how it plans to curb excessive speculation in the energy market.

Earlier on Wednesday, meanwhile, it revealed proposals for the spot FX market — an area that has until now escaped the scrutiny of regulators due to its over-the-counter status.

According to the FT, the so-called spot-FX regulatory loophole was cemented in 2004 when a US appeals court ruled that the agency lacked jurisdiction in foreign exchange spot trading.

In the last few years, however, this has caused the market — estimated to be worth some $3,700bn-a-day global, according to Aite — to be the target of many unscrupulous and unregistered operators.

In the first instance, the proposals set out by the CFTC would require registration of off-exchange FX operators as well as disclosure, record-keeping, financial reporting, minimum capital and other operational standards — because believe it or not, no such compulsory requirements exist. It should be noted that more reputable operators do provide these details voluntarily.

The Hedge Fund Law blog has rather decently provided a link to the whole proposal here, but it’s worth pointing out the following snippets (our emphasis):

Subject to certain exceptions (e.g., for certain regulated financial intermediaries not under the Commission’s jurisdiction as established in the CRA), the Proposal would require persons offering to be or acting as counterparties to retail forex transactions but not primarily or substantially engaged in the exchange traded futures business, to register as retail foreign exchange dealers (“RFEDs”) with the CFTC. Registered futures commission merchants (“FCMs”) that are “primarily or substantially” (as defined in the Proposal) engaged in the activities set forth in the Act’s definition of an FCM would be permitted to engage in retail forex transactions without also registering as RFEDs.

The Proposal would further require certain entities other than RFEDs and FCMs that intermediate retail forex transactions to register with the Commission as introducing brokers (“IBs”), commodity trading advisors (“CTAs”), commodity pool operators (“CPOs”), or associated persons (“APs”) of such entities, as appropriate, and to be subject to the Act and regulations applicable to that registrant category. In addition, the Proposal would require any IB that introduces retail forex transactions to an RFED or FCM to be guaranteed by that RFED or FCM.

The Proposal would also implement the $20 million minimum net capital standard established in the CRA for registering as an RFED or offering retail forex transactions as an FCM; propose an additional volume-based minimum capital threshold calculated on the amount an FCM or RFED owes as counterparty to retail forex transactions; and require RFEDs or FCMs engaging in retail forex transactions to collect security deposits in a minimum amount in order to prudentially limit the leverage available to their retail customers on such transactions at 10 to 1.

So in short, the proposals aim to establish a minimum capital base for all retail FX operators and restrict leverage provided to clients to 10:1 (which is a big curb considering it was common for some operators to provide as much 200:1 on a regular basis).

Commenting on the proposals Euromoney’s Lee Oliver noted:

Perhaps the most important new proposal is that FCMs and RFEDs will be required to maintain net capital of $20m plus 5% of the amount by which liabilities to retail FX customers exceed $10m. The CFTC is also suggesting that retail clients will be limited to 10% margins.

Retails service providers have 60 days to respond to the proposals.

Nine players – FXCM, GFT, Oanda, IBFX, Gain Capital, FX Solutions, FXDD, PFG Best, and CMS Forex – have forged the Foreign Exchange Dealers Coalition (FXDC) to manage the industry’s response.

Unsurprisingly their view is the proposals would damage the US FX industry, and do so by forcing it further afield into markets like the UK. As the coalition’s statement read (H/T Lee Oliver):

…the CFTC’s recent rule proposal, which would limit customer trading leverage to 10 to 1, would be a crippling blow to the industry and drive it offshore into the hands of foreign competitors. Even worse, it would encourage fraud both at home and abroad as customers seeking to trade retail forex would have no other legitimate domestic alternative.

As for the immediate effect of the leverage clampdown, they wrote:

• Today the U.S. retail forex industry can boast hundreds of thousands of live accounts. Should the 10 to 1 leverage rule be adopted 90% of those accounts can be expected to go offshore. And the first place they’ll go is to the United Kingdom where customers can trade with leverage as high as 200 to 1.

• The 10 to 1 leverage rule will be highly unpopular with traders. The fact is 100 to leverage is very popular with the retail forex trading public. They simply will not accept 10 to 1 leverage.

• Unregulated dealers from around the world will also be the beneficiaries of the 10 to 1 leverage rule. These unregulated forex dealers don’t have to worry about capital requirements, risk management models, marketing ethics, dealing practices or even returning a customer’s funds. These dealers will be out of the reach of the CFTC and they will thrive.

And while the CFTC’s motivations may have been linked to a wish to clampdown on fraud, the dealers suggest the rules might end up having the very opposite effect:

• The problem of Forex fraud will get worse absent legitimate dealers offering retail forex. Retail forex fraud is not something that is caused by the actions of retail forex dealers; rather it is caused by unlicensed con-men who masquerade as forex experts promising silly and unjustifiable returns before disappearing with customer funds. That is why the FXDC fully su

February 11, 2009

Catastrophic Fall in 2009 Global Food Production

Filed under: Uncategorized — ktetaichinh @ 4:33 am
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from Market Skeptics by Eric deCarbonnel
Lack of credit will worsen food shortage

A lack of credit for farmers curbed their ability to buy seeds and fertilizers in 2008/2009 and will limit production around the world. The effects of droughts worldwide will also be amplified by the smaller amount of seeds and fertilizers used to grow crops.

Low commodity prices will worsen food shortage

The low prices at the end of 2008 discouraged the planting of new crops in 2009. In Kansas for example, farmers seeded nine million acres, the smallest planting for half a century. Wheat plantings this year are down about 4 million acres across the US and about 1.1 million acres in Canada. So even discounting drought related losses, the US, Canada, and other food producing nations are facing lower agricultural output in 2009.

Europe will not make up for the food shortfall

Europe, the only big agricultural region relatively unaffected by drought, is set for a big drop in food production. Due to the combination of a late plantings, poorer soil conditions, reduced inputs, and light rainfall, Europe’s agricultural output is likely to fall by 10 to 15 percent.

Stocks of foodstuff are dangerously low

Low stocks of foodstuff make the world’s falling agriculture output particularly worrisome. The combined averaged of the ending stock levels of the major trading countries of Australia, Canada, United States, and the European Union have been declining steadily in the last few years:

2002-2005: 47.4 million tons
2007: 37.6 million tons
2008: 27.4 million tons

These inventory numbers are dangerously low, especially considering the horrifying possibility that China’s 60 million tons of grain reserves doesn’t actually exists.

Global food Catastrophe

The world is heading for a drop in agricultural production of 20 to 40 percent, depending on the severity and length of the current global droughts. Food producing nations are imposing food export restrictions. Food prices will soar, and, in poor countries with food deficits, millions will starve.

The deflation debate should end now

The droughts plaguing the world’s biggest agricultural regions should end the debate about deflation in 2009. The demand for agricultural commodities is relatively immune to developments in the business cycles (at least compared to that of energy or base metals), and, with a 20 to 40 percent decline in world production, already rising food prices are headed significantly higher.

In fact, agricultural commodities NEED to head higher and soon, to prevent even greater food shortages and famine. The price of wheat, corn, soybeans, etc must rise to a level which encourages the planting of every available acre with the best possible fertilizers. Otherwise, if food prices stay at their current levels, production will continue to fall, sentencing millions more to starvation.

Competitive currency appreciation

Some observers are anticipating “competitive currency devaluations” in addition to deflation for 2009 (nations devalue their currencies to help their export sector). The coming global food shortage makes this highly unlikely. Depreciating their currency in the current environment will produce the unwanted consequence of boosting exports—of food. Even with export restrictions like those in China, currency depreciation would cause the outflow of significant quantities of grain via the black market.

Instead of “competitive currency devaluations”, spiking food prices will likely cause competitive currency appreciation in 2009. Foreign exchange reserves exist for just this type of emergency. Central banks around the world will lower domestic food prices by either directly selling off their reserves to appreciate their currencies or by using them to purchase grain on the world market.

Appreciating a currency is the fastest way to control food inflation. A more valuable currency allows a nation to monopolize more global resources (ie: the overvalued dollar allows the US to consume 25% of the world’s oil despite having only 4% of the world’s population). If China were to selloff its US reserves, its enormous population would start sucking up the world’s food supply like the US has been doing with oil.

On the flip side, when a nation appreciates its currency and starts consuming more of the world’s resources, it leaves less for everyone else. So when china appreciates the yuan, food shortages worldwide will increase and prices everywhere else will jump upwards. As there is nothing that breeds social unrest like soaring food prices, nations around the world, from Russia, to the EU, to Saudi Arabia, to India, will sell off their foreign reserves to appreciate their currencies and reduce the cost of food imports. In response to this, China will sell even more of its reserves and so on. That is competitive currency appreciation.

When faced with competitive currency appreciation, you do NOT want to be the world’s reserve currency. The dollar is likely to do very poorly as central banks liquidate trillions in US holdings to buy food and appreciate their currencies.

January 31, 2009

Chinese Premier Blames Recession on U.S. Actions

Beijing Rethinks Some of Its American Investments

[Currency intervention is the act of government, central bank, or speculators to increasing or reducing the value of a particular currency against another currency.

Chinese Yuan– When a consumer in the US buys a Chinese product, Chinese manufacturers are paid in US dollars. These US dollars are then deposited in the a Chinese bank account. At this point the local Chinese bank needs to converts the US dollars into yuan. The bank does this by selling the US dollar to the Chinese central bank, the People’s Bank of China. Since the trade between the US and Chinese does not balance, there is a shortage of yuan, and a surplus of US dollars in the Chinese central bank. Under normal rules of international trade, the Chinese central bank should sell its US dollars on international markets, and buy yuan in exchange, resulting in a self-correcting system where a the US dollar weakens, and the Chinese yuan strengthens until equilibrium is restored and the trade gap closes. However, in order to avoid this situation, the Chinese central bank bends the rules by taking the excess dollars inflows and sterilizes them by buying US denominated assets, such as US Treasuries. This has the effect of removing the excess dollars from currency exchange markets where they can cause a correction in the exchange rates. Thus, instead of using the US dollars to buying yuan on the international currency market, the Chinese central bank manipulates the exchange rates by creating yuan, and buying US debt. This “printing” of Chinese Yuan by the central bank is not with out consequence, however, since in excess it will eventually lead to inflation, causing the consumer prices to rise.]

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao squarely blamed the U.S.-led financial system for the world’s deepening economic slump, in the most public indication yet of discord between the U.S. government and its largest creditor.

Leaders in China, the world’s third-largest economy, have been surprised and upset over how much the problems of the U.S. financial sector have hurt China’s holdings. In response, Beijing is re-examining its U.S. investments, say people familiar with the government’s thinking.

Mr. Wen, the first Chinese premier to visit the annual global gathering of economic and political leaders in Davos, Switzerland, delivered a strongly worded indictment of the causes of the crisis, clearly aimed largely at the United States though he didn’t name it. Mr. Wen blamed an “excessive expansion of financial institutions in blind pursuit of profit,” a failure of government supervision of the financial sector, and an “unsustainable model of development, characterized by prolonged low savings and high consumption.”

Chinese leaders have felt burned by a series of bad experiences with U.S. investments they had believed were safe, say people familiar with their thinking, including holdings in Morgan Stanley, the collapsed Reserve Primary Fund and mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As a result, the people say, government leaders decided not to make new investments in a number of U.S. companies that sought China’s capital. China’s pullback from Fannie and Freddie debt helped push up rates on U.S. mortgages last year just as Washington was seeking to revive the U.S. housing market.

To be sure, China’s economy now is so closely intertwined with the U.S.’s that major, abrupt changes are unlikely. The U.S.-China economic relationship has become arguably the world’s most important. China has been recycling its vast export earnings by financing the U.S. deficit through buying Treasurys, helping to keep U.S. interest rates low and give American consumers more spending power to buy Chinese exports.

China now has roughly $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, and has continued to buy U.S. government debt — surpassing Japan in September as the biggest foreign holder of Treasurys, by one official U.S. measure. China must continue to recycle its trade surplus if it doesn’t want its currency to appreciate too quickly.

Still, the relatively smooth financial ties between the two powers that underpinned the global economic boom of recent years are being tested. As both sides survey the wreckage of the U.S. housing bubble and credit crunch, mutual recriminations are raising doubts about the relationship.

The Chinese premier’s remarks came a few days after Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner fanned the flames when he accused China of “manipulating” its currency during his confirmation process. That was widely seen as an escalation of long-standing U.S. complaints that China artificially depresses the value of the yuan to bolster its exports, and prompted strong denials from Beijing. The Obama administration has since played down the statement’s significance.

More Friction

Frictions between the two countries began to worsen long before Mr. Obama took office. The Chinese central bank last year stopped lending its Treasury holdings for fear the borrowers will go bankrupt, according to people familiar with the discussions — a decision that disrupted the functioning of the Treasury market. Beijing rejected pleas by Washington to resume its lending of Treasurys, the people said.

Meanwhile, China — for years the largest foreign investor in bonds from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — has been sharply trimming its holdings of that debt. After making direct net purchases of $46.0 billion in the first half of 2008, China’s government and companies were net sellers of $26.1 billion in the five months through November, according to the latest U.S. data.

Weak demand for such debt from China and other foreign investors helped prompt the Federal Reserve to announce in November that it would take the step of buying up to $600 billion in debt from Fannie, Freddie and two other U.S. government-related mortgage businesses.

While Chinese officials have generally been circumspect in public, some Chinese commentators have sharpened their rhetoric in recent weeks. Washington “should not expect continuous inflow of more cheap foreign capital to fund its one-after-another massive bailouts,” said a December editorial in the government-owned, English-language China Daily. Officials at the newspaper said the commentary wasn’t ordered by the government.

Cash-rich Chinese financial institutions are under withering criticism at home for investments in the West that have lost money, such as a $5.6 billion stake in Morgan Stanley purchased by China’s sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corp., 13 months ago. The U.S. company’s shares have dropped around 60% since then. Chinese institutions have rebuffed entreaties to invest in struggling U.S. companies even as investors from Japan and the Middle East have stepped up.

[chinese premier wen jiabao]

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao

For years, Washington has pushed China to adopt an economic and financial system more like that in the U.S. — arguing, for example, that China should liberalize capital flows in and out of the country. In many cases, China has moved more slowly than the U.S. desired. Beijing has resisted American pressure to let its currency appreciate in line with market forces, for example, which economists say has helped inflate China’s trade surplus.

But often, U.S. suggestions had a sympathetic audience among reformers in China’s government, and many of China’s financial overhauls in recent decades have been inspired by the U.S. model. Now, some of these changes, and their proponents, have lost credibility in China in the wake of the financial meltdown, and recently commentators and officials in China have been increasingly critical about Washington.

Amid high-level Sino-U.S. economic talks in Beijing in early December, Chinese officials admonished the U.S. and Europe for their financial governance.

Vice Premier Wang Qishan, China’s top finance official, called on the U.S. to “take all necessary measures to stabilize its economy and financial markets to ensure the security of China’s assets and investments in the U.S.”

A similar complaint was issued by Lou Jiwei, chairman of CIC, the government fund established in 2007 to seek higher returns on a $200 billion chunk of China’s currency holdings. Mr. Lou said in a December speech that he has “lost confidence” because of inconsistent government policies concerning support for Western banks. “We don’t know when these institutions will be invested in by their governments,” he said.

Fate of U.S. Investments

CIC officials are especially sensitive about the fate of their U.S. investments because they have been under fire for the poor performance of earlier deals. CIC has sustained large paper losses on the $3 billion it invested in Blackstone Group LP in June 2007, as well as the Morgan Stanley stake. Staffed by officials, some western-educated, who have helped promote financial-market liberalization in China, CIC is also viewed by some Chinese as a symbol of the country’s close financial ties to the U.S. — another reason it has been in the crosshairs.

Around October, a lengthy Chinese-language essay began circulating on the Internet excoriating Mr. Lou and other top CIC officials, along with Zhou Xiaochuan, China’s central bank governor, for being too close to the U.S. and then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. The diatribe quickly gained wide circulation in Chinese financial circles. One passage charged that Mr. Zhou “colluded with Henry Paulson to buy U.S. bonds, forced [Chinese yuan] appreciation, attached China’s economy to the U.S. and broke China’s economic independence.”

Chinese and U.S. interests remain deeply enmeshed. Washington’s huge stimulus plans will result in even heavier borrowing, and, while rising savings in the U.S. could create more domestic capital to help fund that, Chinese lending will remain important.

Japan investors, too, have been selling Fannie and Freddie debt and making other moves to limit their U.S. risk. An official at another Asian central bank in charge of managing hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign exchange reserves noted late last year that trading in some derivative instruments had factored in a slightly higher possibility of default by the U.S. government, though that prospect is still viewed by most investors as extremely low.

The alarm for Chinese leaders started ringing loudly in July and August as problems deepened at Fannie and Freddie. Senior Chinese leaders, who hadn’t been apprised in detail of how China’s reserves were being invested, learned for the first time in published reports that the country’s exposure to debt from those two alone totaled nearly $400 billion, say people familiar with the matter.

Fearing that the U.S. government might not fully back the companies, China demanded and received regular briefings throughout the peak of the crisis from high-level Treasury Department officials, including Mr. Paulson, on the market for U.S. debt securities — especially those of the mortgage giants.

Mr. Paulson and other Treasury officials spoke regularly with Vice Premier Wang and other senior Chinese officials to soothe their concerns.

The World Economic Forum in Davos was full of verbal tongue-lashings for the U.S. from countries such as Russia and China. The world is calling for the U.S. to get its act together. Video courtesy of Reuters.

Hit With Questions

Chinese officials often bombarded their U.S. counterparts with questions, according to people who were present at meetings.

While Mr. Paulson was in Beijing for the Olympics in August, he dined with Mr. Zhou, the central bank chief, at the Whampoa Club, an upscale restaurant that serves modern Chinese cuisine in a traditional courtyard building near the city’s Financial Street.

On Sept. 7, Mr. Paulson announced that the U.S. government would seize Fannie and Freddie, but Chinese officials remained concerned.

At one briefing for Chinese officials to explain the change, said people present, they questioned and debated the meaning of nearly every line of the new Treasury plan.

Then Washington allowed Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. to collapse, further shaking Beijing’s faith. One casualty was CIC’s nearly $5.4 billion investment in the Reserve Primary Fund, the money-market fund that “broke the buck” in September as a result of the Lehman collapse.

CIC had placed money in the Primary Fund because “money market funds are supposed to be very safe,” said a Chinese official in an interview late last year. But on Sept. 16, the Primary Fund’s managers announced that they were delaying redemptions.

CIC officials emailed Reserve asking to withdraw all of its money from the fund, and promptly received a reply agreeing to the request, says the Chinese official.

CIC officials believed the agreement meant that CIC had become a creditor to the troubled fund, and therefore was entitled to all of its money.

A Reserve spokeswoman says the company doesn’t comment on individual clients.

Later in the day on Sept. 16, Reserve announced that the Primary Fund’s net asset value had fallen to 97 cents a share, below the standard $1.00 level.

Reserve initially said redemption requests received before 3 p.m. that day would be honored in full, but has since said that the net asset value already was down to 99 cents a share by 11 a.m.

As Reserve further delayed payments, CIC began to fear that it might not get all of its money.

The Reserve issue “is causing a lot of concern with a lot of financial institutions in China,” said the Chinese official.

Some officials expected that the U.S. and its financial institutions would better protect China from loss.

“If the U.S. is treating us this way, eventually that will be enough cause for concern in the stability of the [U.S.] system,” the official said.

A CIC spokeswoman declined to comment on the current status of the dispute.

Update:

JANUARY 25, 2009- Chinese Ministry denies Geithner’s Currency Claim

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